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FLMA Retaliation: Issues with Causation  
Author: David Franzmathes 
Introduction 
 When an expectant mother takes maternity leave to have and care for her newborn child, 
social policy has come to dictate that her job ought to be secure and waiting for her when she is 
able to return to work.1 The concept of the “stay at home mom” is no longer something expected 
of women, and has become a less common practice.2 Most members of society—men and 
women—now juggle the dichotomy of work and family life.3 The Family Medical Leave Act of 
1993 (“FMLA”) was enacted to ensure job security when certain medical conditions necessitate 
that individuals take leave from work in order to care for themselves or their loved ones.4 
However, the FMLA is silent as to what protection those individuals are afforded once they 
return to their positions or to a comparable one.5 
 Courts have nevertheless recognized that FMLA protection persists after an employee 
returns from leave.6 Once employees return to their positions, the employer is not free to 
terminate them for having taken that leave.7 While this right against retaliation is recognized, 
courts struggle to find the  textual source claim within the language of the FMLA.8 Without 
guidance from the Supreme Court on this issue, the circuits disagree on the specific provision in 
which the claim is rooted.9 This is not a mere academic inquiry.10 The textual differences 
                                                          
1 29 U.S.C. § 2601. 
2 See id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325, 331 (1st Cir. 2005). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 331-32. 
8 Id. at 331. 
9 Id. 
10 See Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166-69 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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between the candidate FMLA’s provisions have implications on the burden of proof that a 
plaintiff bears in order to establish that their leave was the cause of an employer’s adverse 
employment decision.11 Specifically, there is confusion as to whether a “but for” standard of 
causation or a lesser “negative factor” standard ought to apply.12 Section I of this comment will 
first outline the background of retaliation claims under the FMLA, as well as the standards of 
causation which a plaintiff might be required to meet. Section II will describe how the circuits 
have approached this issue and the different conclusions that they have reached. Section III will 
explore the methodologies of statutory interpretation used by the Supreme Court in analyzing 
similar statutes. Finally, Section IV of this comment will argue that the language of the FMLA is 
similar to other anti-discrimination statutes the Court has interpreted such that the Court would 
likely apply a “but for” causation standard to retaliation claims under the FMLA.  
SECTION I 
The FMLA 
 Congress promulgated the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in order to address 
rising concerns that employees did not have adequate job security when tending to the serious 
health conditions of either themselves or their immediate family members.13 The FMLA bolsters 
job security by “entitl[ing] employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth 
or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health 
condition employees” to take protected leave.14 While this leave need not be paid, the FMLA 
ensures that the leave is protected by prohibiting employers from interfering with employee’s 
                                                          
11 See id. at 166. 
12 See id. at 166-169. 
13 29 U.S.C. § 2601.  
14 Id. 
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right to take leave, or discriminate against those who object to prohibited acts under the statute.15 
Furthermore, the FMLA requires the reinstatement of an employee who has taken leave to the 
same or “equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and 
conditions of employment” upon their return to work.16  
The FMLA provides comfort to employees who might need a break from work to care for 
themselves or loved ones, knowing that their jobs will be waiting for them when they return. 
However, the language of the FMLA seems to suggest that the protection ends there. The FMLA 
does not expressly prohibit an employer from taking adverse employment action—i.e. 
termination—against an employee immediately following the employee’s reinstatement; in other 
words, from retaliating against employees for exercising their rights under the statute. 
Nevertheless, both the courts and the Department of Labor (“DOL”) have filled this gap in the 
statutory language and recognize a private right of action for employees harmed in this way.17  
While all may agree that employees have a right of action for retaliation under the 
FMLA, the circuits disagree as to which provision of the FMLA is a basis for such a claim.18 
This may seem like an academic inquiry, but it may have a substantial impact on the burden of 
proof placed on plaintiffs when establishing a causal link between adverse employment actions 
taken against them and their exercise of their rights under the FMLA.19 This is understandable 
because the failure of the statute to explicitly address the question means there is no express 
                                                          
15 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). 
16 29 U.S.C § 2614(a)(1). 
17 E.g. Woods, 864 F.3d at 166 (“There is little question that given its broad salutary intent, the FMLA prohibits 
retaliation against employees who attempt to exercise their rights under the statute.”); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). 
18 Compare Woods, 864 F.3d at 169 (finding the claim’s authority under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)); with Bryant v. 
Dollar Gen. Corp., 538 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding the cause of action arises from 29 U.S.C. 
§2615(a)(2)); Colburn, 429 F.3d at 331 (finding the source of retaliations claims in the common law and DOL 
regulation 29 C.F.R. §825.200(c)). 
19 See Woods, 864 F.3d at 166-69. 
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language establishing a standard of causation for such conduct.20 Courts, therefore, analyze the 
language of whichever provision they deem as the source of retaliation claims to determine 
which causation standard ought to apply.21 Different sources, with different language, can be the 
difference between a plaintiff satisfying their burden of proof and successfully seeking a remedy 
from the court, or not.  
Courts agree that the authority for a retaliation claim rests somewhere in 29 U.S.C. § 
2615(a) of the FMLA.22 Paragraph (a), “Interference with rights,” provides:  
(1) Exercise of rights 
It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the 
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter. 
(2) Discrimination 
It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by 
this subchapter.23 
 
The dispute is whether the claim arises under subparagraph (a)(1), subparagraph (a)(2), or a 
combination of the two.24  
Causation 
 Courts analyzing the language of either subparagraph have proposed two theories of 
causation.25 First, is the “but for” causation standard utilized in retaliation claims under other 
anti-discrimination statutes such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and 
                                                          
20 Id. at 167. 
21 Id. 
22 See id. at 166; see also Colburn, 429 F.3d at 331. 
23 29 U.S.C. § 2615(1). 
24 Woods, 864 F.3d at 166-67. 
25 Egan v. Delaware River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 273 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).26 The other is a seemingly more relaxed 
“negative factor” standard which was suggested by DOL in its regulation on the enforcement of 
the FMLA, 29 C.F.R. 825.200(c), and which finds a parallel in Title VII’s “motivating factor” 
standard for status  discrimination.27   
The Supreme Court has articulated a distinction between “but for” and “motivating 
factor,” akin to “negative factor,” standards in anti-discrimination retaliation claims.28 The Court 
defines “but for” causation as to “require[] the plaintiff to show that the harm would not have 
occurred in the absence of—that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct.”29 Thus, an action is not 
the cause of an event “if the particular event would have occurred without it.”30 In the 
employment context, this would mean that, under a “but for” standard, plaintiffs must prove that 
their employer would not have taken adverse employment action against them if they had not 
exercised their rights under the statute.31  
The Court also recognizes a lessened standard, referred to as “motivating” factor.32 Under 
a “motivating factor” standard, plaintiffs can establish causation by proving only that some 
protected condition (their race, sex, status, etc.) was present and pushed in favor of the 
employer’s decision to take adverse employment action, even if other factors also motivated the 
                                                          
26 Id. at 272. 
27 Egan, 851 F.3d at 273 (3d Cir. 2017); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003);  
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 416 (2011). 
28 Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 431). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed. 
1984)). 
31 See id. at 2525, 26. 
32 Id. at 2526. 
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decision and even if the same decision would have been reached based on other non-
discriminatory factors. 33 
Under the FMLA, some courts have equated the DOL’s “negative factor” standard to the 
“motivating factor” standard expressed by the Supreme Court.34 Courts refer to this lessened 
standard as a mixed-motive standard.35 Courts look to the Supreme Court’s application of the 
“motivating factor” standard under other anti-discrimination statutes as a template for the 
application of the mixed-motive standard under the FMLA.36 The mixed-motive standard 
requires plaintiffs must to prove that their employer used their taking of FMLA leave as a factor 
in coming to an adverse employment decision, not that it was the “most important factor upon 
which the employer acted.”37  
“Motivating factor” is distinguishable from “but for” causation because “motivating 
factor” causation allows plaintiffs to prove causation in situations where the adverse employment 
action would have taken place even if the plaintiff had not exercised his or her rights under a 
particular statute, whereas “but for” causation would not.38 Therefore, the causation standard can 
play a pivotal role in whether a plaintiff can establish liability. How this applies to the FMLA 
relies heavily on statutory interpretation. 
SECTION II 
Deference to the Department of Labor 
                                                          
33 Id. 
34 Egan, 851 F.3d at 272. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526, 2532. 
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 Some courts, when addressing the issue of the causation standard for retaliation claims 
under the FMLA, look to the DOL for guidance as to how the statute should be interpreted.39 
Although the FMLA does not expressly state the causation standard which applies to retaliation 
claims under the statute, the DOL has promulgated a regulation which expressly states that a 
“negative factor” standard applies.40 Under the DOL regulation 29 C.F.R. §825.220(c), 
“employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, 
such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions.”41 The DOL stated that the purpose of 
promulgating this provision was to “state explicitly that the Act's prohibition on interference in 
29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) includes claims that an employer has discriminated or retaliated against an 
employee for having exercised his or her FMLA rights.”42 The DOL claimed to have found 
authority for retaliation claims under both sections 2615(a)(1) and (a)(2).43 However, the DOL 
suggests that the claim fits more neatly under paragraph (a)(1)’s44 bar on interference.45 The 
DOL does not, however, explain its rationale for choosing a “negative factor” over a “but for” 
standard.  
The Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. articulated the 
rules concerning appropriate judicial deference to a governmental agency’s construction of a 
statute.46 The threshold question, under Chevron, is whether Congress has addressed the issue at 
hand.47 Congress has not addressed the issue when “the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
                                                          
39 Egan, 851 F.3d at 273. 
40 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) 
41 Id. 
42 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 FR 67934-01 (Nov. 17, 2008). 
43 Id. 
44 For the purposes of this comment, any reference to paragraphs shall refer those contained in 29 U.S.C. § 2615, 
unless otherwise specified. 
45 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 FR 67934-01 (Nov. 17, 2008). 
46 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (2008). 
47 Id. at 843. 
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respect to the specific issue.”48 Courts must then decide “whether the agency's answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.”49 However, if congressional intent is clear from the 
statute’s language, then the agency’s construction is afforded no deference.50 
 When there is silence or ambiguity, the courts must then determine whether congress 
delegated power to the agency to “fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress” by 
promulgating rules and policies.51 If the agency regulation was created pursuant to power 
expressly delegated by Congress to fill a legislative gap, then “[s]uch legislative regulations are 
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”52 In contrast, the Court noted that when delegation is implicit, “considerable weight” is 
to be afforded to the agency’s interpretation.53 In situations where multiple reasonable statutory 
interpretation exist, courts should give deference to the agency’s construction unless “it appears 
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would 
have sanctioned.”54 At this stage of the inquiry the agency’s interpretation must only be a 
reasonable one.55 
Congress expressly gave the DOL authority under Section 2654 of the FMLA to 
“prescribe such regulations as are necessary” to enforce the paragraphs at issue in retaliation 
claims.56 Because the DOL was delegated authority to make rules and polices regarding the 
FMLA and they did so in promulgating 29 C.F.R. 825.220(c), it seems probable Chevron 
                                                          
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 842-843. 
51 Id. at 843. 
52 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)). 
55 See id. 
56 29 U.S.C. § 2654. 
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deference requires courts to give deference to the DOL if there is a finding of “silence or 
ambiguity” in the FMLA, and the DOL’s interpretation is reasonable—a low threshold question. 
Therefore, the crux of the issue at hand rests on which provision of the FMLA the claim of 
retaliation arises from and whether that provision’s language is silent or ambiguous.  
The Circuits’ Approaches 
Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc. 
 The Second Circuit was recently confronted with this issue of determining a causation 
standard as a matter of first impression, a case which serves as an example highlighting the 
struggles courts face with this question.57 In Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, 
Inc., the court determined both the provision of the FMLA establishing a cause of action for a 
retaliation claim and the burden of proof a plaintiff ought to bear in establishing causation in 
bringing these claims.58  The plaintiff in Woods was a substance abuse counselor at one of the 
defendant’s clinics.59 She had been hospitalized several times during her employment due to 
severe anemia.60 The plaintiff claimed that the reason for her terminated absence from work as a 
result of her intermittent hospitalization.61 The defendant claimed she was terminated for poor 
performance.62 The issue in the case turned on the burden of proof required of the plaintiff to 
show causation.63 The Second Circuit ultimately concluded that retaliation claims are grounded 
                                                          
57 Woods, 864 F.3d at 166.  
58 Id. at 162. 
59 Id. at 163. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 Woods, 864 F.3d at 163. 
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in 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) and, giving deference to the opinion of the DOL, that a “negative 
factor” causation standard applies to the claim.64  
 The Second Circuit looked to the statutory language of each paragraph to determine the 
claim’s origin.65 The court reasoned that the claim cannot arise under (a)(2) because an employee 
subjected to an adverse employment action as a result of exercising their rights under the FMLA 
cannot have said to be “opposing any practice made unlawful”—the language found in paragraph 
(a)(2).66 The court instead looked to the rights granted by the FMLA as a whole—the right to 
take leave in conjunction with the right to reinstatement—to find that retaliating against an 
employee for taking leave “interferes” with an employee’s right to reinstatement.67 Because this 
“interference” language is present in (a)(1) rather than (a)(2), the court concluded that the plain 
language of the FMLA suggests that the claim arises from paragraph (a)(1). The court also 
referenced the DOL’s explanation of 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(c), suggesting that (a)(1) is the source 
of retaliation claims, to support of its conclusion.68  
 Having found that the cause of action lies in subpart (a)(1), the court then determined that 
Chevron deference ought to be given to the DOL’s interpretation of the provision, including the 
“negative factor” causation standard, was required.69 The court first found that Chevron 
deference was appropriate by determining that the DOL was delegated authority by Congress “to 
make rules carrying the force of law and [the DOL’s] interpretation to which deference is to be 
given was promulgated in the exercise of that authority,” the Chevron threshold inquiry.70 The 
                                                          
64 Id. at 164. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)). 
67 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). 
68 Id. 
69 Woods, 864 F.3d at 167 
70 Id. at 168. 
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court stated that the Secretary of Labor has the authority to promulgate regulations “to carry out” 
the FMLA under 29 U.S.C. § 2654 and that 825.200(c), the source of the DOL’s interpretation of 
(a)(1)’s retaliation causation standard,  was “promulgated pursuant to that delegation of 
authority.”71 Therefore, the court determined that a Chevron inquiry was appropriate.72 
 Moving to the issue of whether the FMLA is “silent or ambiguous” on the issue, the court 
again examined the language of paragraph (a)(1).73 The Second Circuit looked to Supreme Court 
cases, discussed infra., analyzing anti-discrimination provisions within other statutes, the “Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII, with similar language to determine if 
paragraph (a)(1) is ambiguous in light of those decisions.74 The court distinguished those cases 
by finding that paragraph (a)(1) does not contain language—such as words like “because” that 
the Court had found within the ADEA and Title VII—suggesting “but for” causation.75 
Therefore, the court concluded that the statute is silent on the matter, leaving a gap that Congress 
had authorized the DOL to fill.76 The court went further to say that “express congressional 
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking is a very good indicator of delegation 
meriting Chevron treatment.”77  
 In the final step of Chevron analysis, the court found the DOL’s interpretation reasonable 
as a matter of policy.78 The court pointed to the FMLA’s broad purpose in entitling employees to 
medical leave so that they may care for themselves and their families.79 The court claimed the 
                                                          
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Woods, 864 F.3d at 168. 
75Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 168-69 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)). 
78 Id. at 169. 
79 Id. 
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interpretation is “neither arbitrary or capricious,” comported with notice-and-comment, and 
evidenced “well-reasoned judgement.”80 Therefore, the court determined that the DOL was 
entitled to deference and held that a “negative factor” standard applies in FMLA retaliation 
claims.81  
The Split 
 The main point of difference between the circuits seems to be the textual source of 
retaliation claims rather than the causation standard to employ. Courts find the source of the 
claims to be rooted in either paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or a combination of the two.82 Most circuits, 
despite finding different provisions of the FMLA to be the source of the claim, utilize the 
“negative factor” standard articulated by the DOL.83  
The majority of courts find that the claim is rooted within subparagraph (a)(1). The Third 
Circuit agrees with the Second Circuit that subparagraph (a)(1) is the textual source.84 The Third 
Circuit had previously found the authority for FMLA retaliation claims to be within the DOL 
regulation itself, but, in Egan v. Delaware River Port Authority, the court analyzed the 
construction of the regulation under Chevron.85 In determining whether the FMLA is ambiguous 
on the issue, the court asserted that it must “read the language in [the] broader context of the 
statute as a whole” and that if the language is “clear and unambiguous, we uphold the plain 
                                                          
80 Id. 
81 Woods, 864 F.3d at 169. 
82 Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401(finding the claim within the language of (a)(2)); Egan, 851 F.3d at 269. ((a)(1)); Colburn, 
429 F.3d at 331. (within the entirety of Section 2654). 
83 See Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401-02; see also Egan, 851 F.3d at 269-71; Colburn, 429 F.3d at 331-32; Woods, 864 
F.3d at 166-69. 
84 Egan, 851 F.3d at 269. 
85 Id. 
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meaning of the statute.”86 The court found that the language “interference” within (a)(1) is 
subject to multiple interpretations.87 Specifically, the Third Circuit found “interference” 
unclear.88 One reasonable interpretation is that “[i]nterference could also occur if an employee 
fears that he or she will be retaliated against for taking such leave.”89 Conversely, “interference” 
could be read to exclude retaliation, and apply only to impeding an employee’s ability to take 
leave or to be returned to an equivalent position.90 Therefore, the court found the statute 
ambiguous.91 
 The Third Circuit recognized that the DOL finds the source of retaliation claims in 
paragraph (a)(1) of the FMLA. 92  The court then determined whether this interpretation is 
reasonable construction of the statute.93 The court claimed that this conclusion is “consistent with 
the purpose of the FMLA” and that “the established understanding at the time the FMLA was 
enacted was that employer actions that deter employees’ participation in protected activities 
constitute interference or restraint with the employees’ exercise of their rights, and attaching 
negative consequences to the exercise of protected rights surely tends to chill an employee’s 
willingness to exercise those rights.”94 The Third Circuit also shares the Sixth Circuit’s opinion 
                                                          
86 Id. (quoting Geisinger Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 794 F.3d 383, 391 (3d Cir. 
2015); Cheruku v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 662 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
87 Id. at 270. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
90 See Egan, 851 F.3d at 270. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 271. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. (quoting Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)) (Internal quotes omitted). 
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that allowing for retaliation would undermine the purpose of the FMLA as evidence that DOL’s 
construction of the statute is reasonable.95 
 The Third Circuit then turned to whether the “negative factor” causation standard 
suggested by the DOL is a reasonable interpretation of the statute’s plain language.96 The court 
explained that a “negative factor” standard “makes sense, especially since a claim of retaliation 
includes an implication that the employer was motivated at least in part by the employee's use of 
FMLA leave.”97 The court noted that (a)(1) does not expressly require a showing of intent by the 
employer, so that a lesser standard of causation is not barred by the language of the statute and 
therefore a gap for the DOL to fill.98 The court recognized the possible implication of Supreme 
Court cases analyzing the language of anti-discrimination provisions within the ADEA and Title 
VII, but concluded that those cases do not apply for two reasons.99 First, there is no ambiguity 
because (a)(1) “does not provide a causation standard and thus does not unambiguously require 
the use of “but-for” causation.”100 Secondly, the DOL’s use of “the phrase ‘a negative factor,’ 
resembles the lessened causation standard in [the Title VII amendment] and stands in contrast to 
the “because” language in the ADEA and Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.”101 To this point, 
the court reasoned that a “negative factor” was a reasonably constructed standard in light of 
Congress’s willingness to implement a lessened standard in the anti-discrimination provisions in 
                                                          
95 Id. (citing Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401). The court cites the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Bryant in support that the DOL’s 
reasonable interpretation of paragraph (a)(1), even though the Sixth Circuit was analyzing the regulations 
interpretation of (a)(2). See Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401. 
96 Egan, 851 F.3d at 271-72. 
97 Id. at 272. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 273. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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Title VII.102 Therefore, the court gave deference to the DOL and applies a “negative factor” 
causation standard.103 
Some courts disagree and find subparagraph (a)(2) as the textual source of FMLA 
retaliation claims. The Sixth Circuit, for example, disagrees a with the Second and Third 
Circuits, at least on the issue of source.104  Similar to the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, in 
Bryant v. Dollar General Corp., was most interested with an employee’s right to reinstatement, 
to be restored to an equivalent position when returning from leave.105 The court stated that “the 
FMLA does not provide leave for leave's sake, but instead provides leave with an expectation an 
employee will return to work after the leave ends.”106 The Sixth Circuit continued that “any right 
to take unpaid leave would be utterly meaningless if the statute's bar against discrimination failed 
to prohibit employers from considering an employee's FMLA leave as a negative factor in 
employment decisions.”107 While the analysis is similar to the of the Second Circuit, the Sixth 
Circuit views retaliation as a sort of discrimination against employees who take FMLA leave, 
rather than “interference” with their right to do so.108 This determination is what places the claim 
under (a)(2), instead of (a)(1).109 
However, the question before the Sixth Circuit was not which causation standard ought to 
apply to retaliation claims, but whether retaliation claims were authorized under the FMLA at 
all.110 After establishing that the cause of action exists under paragraph (a)(2), the court 
                                                          
102 Id. 
103 Egan, 851 F.3d at 274. 
104 Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. (quoting Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 978 (8th Cir.2005)). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Bryant, 538 F.3d at 401. 
110 Id. 
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concluded broadly that the DOL’s interpretation of section 2615 is therefore reasonable and a 
valid exercise of agency authority.111 Determining that the DOL had the requisite authority, the 
court then gave Chevron deference to the DOL, holding that the FMLA “prohibit[s] employers 
from considering an employee's use of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment 
decisions.”112 The court, in doing so, adopted the “negative factor” causation standard but does 
so finding the claim for retaliation to be grounded in paragraph (a)(2).113 The court adopted this 
standard without any inquiry into whether the language of (a)(2) is ambiguous on the standard of 
causation. 
Similarly finding subparagraph (a)(2) to be the textual source of the claim, the district 
court in Woods, took the next step and analyzed the language of the provision for ambiguity.114 
The court analyzed the language of paragraph (a)(2), having thought it to be the source of the 
claim under Circuit precedent and having similar language to the provisions of the ADEA and 
Title VII, previously analyzed by the Supreme Court.115 Specifically, the court pointed to the 
language used in paragraph (a)(2), that it is “unlawful for any employer to discharge ... any 
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by the FMLA.”116 The court put emphasis 
on the word “for” within the paragraph, equating it to the “because” language indicative of “but 
for” causation.117 The court also noted the Second Circuit’s stance that the “FMLA's anti-
retaliation provision has the same underlying purpose as Title VII—and almost identical 
                                                          
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 402. 
113 Id. 
114 Woods, No. Woods v. Start Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., No. 13CIV4719AMDSMG, 2016 WL 590458, 
at 2* (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2016), vacated, 864 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2017). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 2* (citing 29 U.S.C. §2615 (a)(2)) (interion quotations omitted). 
117 Id. 
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wording.”118 Therefore, the court held that because of the utilization of the word “for” in (a)(2), 
that a “but for” causation standard applies to FMLA retaliation claims.119 Because the Second 
Circuit, the appellate court reviewing this case, found the source of the claim to be in (a)(1) 
rather than (a)(2), it did not address the accuracy of the trial court’s analysis.120 
Other courts, however, have decided not to designate either subparagraph as the source of 
FLMA retaliation claims. The First Circuit, for example, refrained from the debate over which 
paragraph held the claim and instead found that retaliation claims are found somewhere within 
the entirety of Section 3654. Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Division 
acknowledged disagreement between the circuits as to the source of the claim, but viewed the 
distinction as unimportant.121 Instead, the court claimed that cause of action is recognized 
generally “in the statute and specifically [in] the interpretative regulation 29 C.F.R. § 
825.220(c).”122 The court looked to the DOL regulation as an unambiguous interpretation of the 
FMLA, permitting retaliation within section 2615.123 The court referenced the term 
“interference” in paragraph (a)(1) as a point of difference between the circuits and the confusion 
over whether “interference” includes acts of retaliation.124 The court stated, however, that 
whether a claim is “interference” or not—i.e. plead under (a)(1) or (a)(2)—a claim’s “elements 
actually differ depending on whether the plaintiff is, at bottom, claiming that the employer 
denied his or her substantive rights under the FMLA or that the employer retaliated against him 
or her for having exercised or attempted to exercise those rights.”125 Therefore, the court did not 
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recognize a distinction between the standards of proof under either provision; instead, it drew a 
distinction in the standard of proof between the different kinds of claims brought under the two 
provisions.126 The court asserted that retaliation claims under the FMLA, whether interference or 
not, always bear the same standard of proof—the “negative factor” causation standard put forth 
by the DOL regulation.127  
While there is disagreement as to the textual source of retaliation claims, most courts 
agree that a negative factor standard ought to apply.128 But, as evident in Woods, (a)(1) and (a)(2) 
may carry different standards of causation.129 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADEA 
and Title VII address this concern.   
SECTION III 
ADEA and Title VII Supreme Court Analysis 
 Courts recognize that one strategy to resolve the issue is to examine how the Supreme 
Court has interpreted similar language in like statutes.130 The ADEA and Title VII, specifically, 
contain anti-discrimination provisions similar to the provisions of the FMLA. Courts will often 
look to Supreme Court cases analyzing these statutes for guidance.131 Two cases, Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc. and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, are 
particularly helpful.  
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 In Gross, the question before the Court was whether direct evidence of discrimination is 
required to obtain a jury instruction of a mixed-motive causation standard under the ADEA.132 
The Court stated that the language of a statute must be assumed to express legislative intent 
through its ordinary meaning.133 The relevant provision of the ADEA provides: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.134  
 
The Court determined that the key language evidencing causation within this provision is the 
phrase “because of.”135 In order to determine the ordinary meaning of “because of,” the Court 
turned to the dictionary.136 Webster’s Dictionary provided that definition of the word “because” 
is “by reason of.”137 This definition led the Court to interpret the ADEA to mean the 
“requirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ 
that the employer decided to act.”138 The Court found this was indicative of congressional intent 
to establish a “but for” causation standard under this provision of the ADEA.139  
Further, the Court claimed that “where the statutory text is silent on the allocation of the 
burden of persuasion, we begin with the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of 
failing to prove their claims.”140 The Court noted that there is no evidence of congressional intent 
to suggest a departure from this default rule and establish a mixed-motive standard under the 
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ADEA.141 The Court, therefore, held that the plain language of ADEA requires the burden 
remain on the plaintiff to prove his protected actions were the “but for” cause of the employer’s 
adverse decision.142 
The petitioner pointed to an amendment made to Title VII explicitly incorporating a 
“motivating factor” standard discrimination claims brought under Title VII as evidence 
suggesting that the same standard ought to apply to the ADEA.143 The amendment provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment 
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.144 
 
The Court, however, was unpersuaded and held that mixed-motive is not the correct causation 
standard and that the language of the statute suggests the proper standard is “but for.”145 The 
Court stated, “we must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different 
statute without careful and critical examination.”146 The Court found that the fact that the 
ADEA’s text has not been amended to address the issue of causation after the changes to Title 
VII was evidence of congressional intent not to impose the same standard onto the ADEA.147 
The Court reasoned that Congress had the opportunity to amend the ADEA at the time it 
amended Title VII, but chose not to.148 The Court stated “negative implications raised by 
disparate provisions are strongest when the provisions were considered simultaneously when the 
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language raising the implication was inserted.”149 Therefore, the Court asserted that the plain text 
of the statute, rather than another statute’s provisions, is the primary consideration when 
determining the causation standard of a statute that does not expressly provide one.150 
Similarly, in Nassar, the Court analyzed the scope of the amendment to Title VII 
referenced in Gross to determine if it extends to retaliation claims under Title VII.151 The 
amendment expressly established a “motivating factor” standard of causation in status 
discrimination cases, that is, those based on race, sex, religion, etc., but makes no reference to 
retaliation claims.152 The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII provides:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees … because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.153 
The Court began by noting that the default standard in torts claims, such as retaliation, is 
“but for.”154 The Court referred to the Restatement of Torts in claiming “[c]ausation in fact—i.e., 
proof that the defendant's conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff's injury—is a standard 
requirement of any tort claim.”155 From this point, the Court asserted that Congress enacts 
legislation with the knowledge of this default rule, and, in absence of any indication to depart 
from this default, it is presumed that Congress intended to establish a “but for” causation 
standard.156  
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The Court dismissed the argument that the amendment extends to retaliation claims 
because the amendment is found in another part of the statute separate from the provision 
creating retaliation claims and which also expressly limits itself to a list of specific prohibited 
acts under the statute—excluding retaliation.157 Therefore, the Court turned to the plain text 
language of the applicable provision to determine what causation standard Congress intended to 
apply.158  
The Court drew a comparison between the language used in the ADEA provision, 
analyzed in Gross, with the language utilized in this provision of Title VII.159 Title VII uses the 
word “because,” and although not exactly the same as the “because of” language which appears 
in the ADEA, the Court found that “because” alone is similarly indicative of a “but for” standard 
of causation.160 The Court commented that the result in Gross not necessarily binding for other 
statutes, but that the similarity of the language used in the provisions informed the Court’s 
determination of congressional intent.161 Therefore, the Court held that although the amendment 
calls for a “motivating factor”” standard to apply for some claims under Title VII, “but for” is the 
appropriate standard for retaliation claims under the statute.162  
SECTION IV 
Argument 
 The Supreme Court would likely find that retaliation claims brought under the FMLA 
arise from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). In so doing, the Court would likely then determine that the 
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language of the provision is unambiguous in light of the decisions in Gross and Nassar.  
Therefore, the Court would not afford deference to the DOL and instead look to the plain 
language of the statute for congressional intent on the issue of causation. Similar to Gross and 
Nassar, the Court would likely find that “but for” causation is the appropriate standard to apply 
to retaliation claims brought under the FMLA. 
 The circuits err in their analysis of whether the FMLA is ambiguous as to the source of 
retaliation claim within section 2615. The plain language of paragraph (a)(2) consists of nearly 
identical language of that used in the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADEA and Title VII. The 
Second Circuit, in Woods, suggested that (a)(2) could not possibly be the source of a retaliation 
claim because a victim of retaliation cannot be said to have opposed any practice made unlawful 
under the statute.163 However, the anti-retaliation provision within Title VII, which the Supreme 
Court has determined to be the source of retaliation claims, utilizes the same “opposed” language 
as paragraph (a)(2) of the FMLA. The language of Title VII states, in relevant part, “It shall be 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees 
… because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter.”164 Similarly, the language of paragraph (a)(2) states, “It shall be unlawful for any 
employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing 
any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”165 Both provisions use nearly identical language 
to convey that it is unlawful to discriminate for “opposing” unlawful practices. 
The Court would likely agree with the trial court in Woods that the similarity between the 
subject matter of the statutes, both being anti-discrimination statutes, and the utilization of nearly 
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identical language suggests congressional intent to establish liability the same for claims brought 
under each.166 In light of the Supreme Court’s recognition of retaliation claims under the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII, its similarity to (a)(2), and no action by Congress expressing 
any indication to the contrary following the Courts decision in Nassar, the Court would likely 
find that (a)(2) is the textual source of retaliation claims under the FMLA. 
 The Court would then likely find that paragraph (a)(2) unambiguously establishes a “but 
for” causation standard for retaliation claims. The Court has articulated that the next step in the 
analysis is to look at the language of the provision for its ordinary meaning.167 The Court, in 
Nassar, indicated that the default standard of causation in tort actions, such as retaliation claims, 
is a “but for” standard.168 The Court noted that Congress is aware of this backdrop when passing 
legislation.169 Therefore, Congress must indicate that it intended to depart from this default in 
order for another standard of causation to apply.170 Paragraph (a)(2), does not indicate a 
departure from this default, but instead likely evidences congressional intent to establish a “but 
for” causation standard.  
The trial court in Woods suggested that the term “for” within (a)(2) was similarly 
indicative of a “but for” causation standard, like the “because” language utilized in the anti-
retaliation provisions of the ADEA and Title VII.171 The Court would likely follow the same 
procedure as it did in Gross and refer to the dictionary for the ordinary meaning of the language 
of paragraph (a)(2).172 Specifically the Court would examine the plain meaning of the term “for” 
                                                          
166 Woods, No. 13CIV4719AMDSMG, 2016 WL 590458, at 2-3. 
167 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Woods, No. 13CIV4719AMDSMG, 2016 WL 590458, at 3. 
172 Gross, 557 U.S. at 176. 
26 
 
within the excerpt from paragraph (a)(2): “It shall be unlawful for,” like the Court did for the 
language “because of” in the excerpt from the ADEA: “because of such individual's age.”173 
Webster’s dictionary provides that the definition of “for” is “because of.”174 The court is likely to 
inspect the word “for” because it is one of the few differences in the language of the anti-
retaliation provisions of the ADEA and Title VII as compared to the FMLA, and was a point of 
interest in the Third Circuit’s decision in Egan.175 This is the same language the Court 
determined to be indicative of a “but for” causation standard in Gross.176 While the court has 
articulated that the analysis of “because of” in Gross is not controlling to the standards of other 
statutes, it can inform the Court’s decision.177 Like the ADEA and Tile VII in Nassar, the ADEA 
and the FMLA are both statutes barring discrimination and the language of the relevant 
provisions are nearly identical.178 This similarly is such that the Court would likely find that the 
term “for” similarly displays congressional intent to establish a “but for” standard of causation, 
just as it did for the term “because” in Nassar.179  
The failure of the majority of circuits’ inquiries into the FMLA’s ambiguity is that they 
ignore the similarities between the language and subject matter of paragraph (a)(2) and the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII, and the inquiries end too early. The Third Circuit, for example, 
found ambiguity in the word “interferes” within (a)(1) as a determinative indication that the 
statute was ambiguous as to the source of retaliation claims.180 However, the court did this 
without looking to the language of (a)(2) to determine if that provision was unambiguously the 
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source of the claim.181 Additionally, once making this conclusion, the court prematurely gave 
Chevron deference to the DOL’s interpretation that the claim arises from (a)(1). This conclusion 
skewed the remainder of the court’s analysis.182  
Looking solely at the language of paragraph (a)(1) makes the argument for ambiguity 
more reasonable. Circuits’ disagreement between the scope and application of the word 
“interferes” evidences this ambiguity. This sort of ambiguity goes beyond the ordinary meaning 
of the word. Instead, explanation as to how the word “interferes” is to be applied is required. 
From this determination, Chevron deference toward the DOL’s interpretation becomes more 
reasonable as well. As discussed in Section II, the DOL was delegated the authority to fill gaps 
left by Congress to enforce the provision of the FMLA at issue. Therefore, if retaliation was 
grounded in (a)(1), Chevron deference would be warranted so long as the DOL’s regulation is 
reasonable. 
Solely under paragraph (a)(1), the DOL’s interpretation is likely reasonable. Both the 
Second and Third Circuits argued the DOL’s interpretation is reasonable by making conclusory 
statements such as it “makes sense” and is not “arbitrary nor capricious” without any real support 
for those conclusions.183 However, the Third Circuit made a compelling argument in that (a)(1) 
“does not explicitly require a relationship between intent and outcome.”184 If that were the case, 
then an employee could establish liability without a showing that the employer acted “because” 
the employee exercised his or her rights. This possibility moves away from the default “but for” 
standard. Therefore, under (a)(1), a lessened standard of causation would be a reasonable 
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interpretation, and deference would likely be given to the DOL. However, the Court would likely 
find the cause of action under (a)(2), rather than under (a)(1). Therefore, the Third Circuit’s 
analysis under (a)(1), whether accurate or not, is irrelevant because  
The Sixth Circuit similarly ends the inquiry too early. In coming to the conclusion that 
legislative intent and policy dictated a finding that the claim for retaliation arises out of (a)(2), 
the court unnecessarily afforded Chevron deference to the entirety of 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).185 
Having found that the statute unambiguously authorized retaliation claims, the initial inquiry into 
whether Chevron analysis is necessary is erroneous. The court should have instead followed the 
congressional intent within the plain language of the provision. Although not deciding on the 
issue of causation standard, the court nevertheless adopts the DOL’s full interpretation of the 
provision, which includes the “negative factor” causation standard.186 This is contrary to the “but 
for” language of (a)(2), the very provision the court found to be the source of retaliation claims. 
Additionally, this goes too far in affording deference on not only the issue of whether the claim 
exists, the issue before the court, but also on causation, which the court did not analyze. 
  While a majority of courts seem to agree that a “negative factor” standard applies to 
retaliation claims under the FMLA, the Supreme Court would likely disagree. Under Chevron, if 
the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, then courts must follow the legislature’s intent. In 
the case of the FMLA, Congress drafted (a)(2) nearly identically to the anti-retaliation provision 
it drafted in Title VII.187 It cannot be said that Congress’s intent is unclear—anti-retaliation 
claims under the FMLA arise under (a)(2). Similarly unambiguous, Congress used the same sort 
of language the Court found indicative of a “but for” causation standard in Title VII. Therefore, 
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the Supreme Court would likely hold retaliation claims are rooted in 29 U.S.C. §2615(a)(2) and 
that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving causation under a “but for” standard. 
